spread of mixed marriage concurrent with low Jewish ethnic affiliation of the children of such marriages brought about a situation wherein the “enlarged” Jewish population is much larger than the “core” Jewish population. However, even the “enlarged” Jewish population is smaller than the total population entitled to immigration to Israel (aliyah), which includes Jews, children and grandchildren of Jews, and all their respective spouses. The estimates of the “enlarged” Jewish population do not include part of the total number of people eligible for aliyah according to the Israeli Law of Return, namely children and grandchildren of mixed marriage, all with their respective spouses, who live in households without any “core” Jewish member. In the late 1980s, the ratio of “core” to “enlarged” Jewish population in the Russian Federation was roughly 1 to 1.6, and in Ukraine and Belorussia about 1 to 1.4; on the basis of the 2002 Russian census, the ratio of “core” to “enlarged” Jewish population in the Russian Federation was estimated at approximately 1 to 1.9. At the same time, this category of Jewish population is also shrinking. For example, in the Russian Federation, the estimated number of the “enlarged” Jewish population decreased from about 1,100,000 in 1979 to 910,000 in 1989 and to almost 470,000 at the end of 2002.

Demographic Transition and Decline
The Jewish populations of Eastern Europe reached an advanced stage of demographic transition from high to low levels of mortality and fertility almost without exception earlier than the general populations in their respective countries. For example, in 1931–1932 in Poland, life expectancy reached 56.2 years for Jewish males and 59.1 years for Jewish females, whereas for the total population of the country these figures were only 48.2 and 51.4 years, respectively, and even in 1948 this indicator was lower for males in the total Polish population—55.6 years. Especially pronounced over the course of demographic transition has been the discrepancy in the levels of infant mortality between Jews and the general populations of different countries (see Table 3). Polish data show that in the 1930s this most important mortality indicator of demographic transition was lower for Jewish babies by 68–69 percent. Even according to the most recent data for the Russian Federation, the much lower levels of infant mortality in the last decades of the twentieth century indicate the persistence of the very sizable discrepancy between Jews and the general population. Jews also retained their more advanced life expectancy levels despite the fact that the most acute demographic problem in the contemporary Russian Federation has been mortality and, within the total population, males have the lowest life expectancy of all developed countries. However, for 1993–1994 the life expectancy of Russia’s male Jews was at 69.6 years, which is about the same as it was at the end of the 1980s; the discrepancy between the total male urban population and that of Jewish males has grown dramatically to about 12 years.

Earlier and prolonged fertility reduction can be ascertained based on examples of Russian and Ukrainian Jewish women for whom we have detailed census data of birth histories. Their fertility has long been too low to ensure replacement. Total Jewish fertility in the Russian Federation and Ukraine has not exceeded 1.6–1.7 children per woman in all the cohorts born since the beginning of the twentieth century. Moreover, according to the data of the 1979 and 1989 censuses, since 1919 the birth cohorts of Jewish women had a very stable and low level of fertility—about 1.4–1.5 or less (see Table 4). The general population had not reached such low levels of fertility even by the end of the period. Moreover, Jewish women have much higher rates of infertility. According to the 1989 census in the Russian Federation, at ages 50–54 (after the fertile period), the share of childless Jewish women was 15.1 but only 8.5 percent for total Russian women.

Before World War II, most of the Jewish populations in Eastern Europe had a positive balance of births and deaths. In some cases (e.g., in the mid-1920s in Belorussia and Ukraine) it was even very positive (see Table 5). During this period, crude birth rates usually decreased faster than did crude death rates (each computed per 1,000 Jews), and the positive balance diminished. Exceptions were Hungary, Romania, and Latvia, where the balance of births and deaths was about nil. However, between 1930 and 1938 the natural increase for Jews in the Russian Federation and Ukraine was negative, that is, the total number of Jewish deaths exceeded the number of Jewish births. The number of Jewish births in the Russian Federation dropped from about 29,000 in 1935–1936 to about 17,000 in 1938–1940, whereas the number of Jewish deaths increased from about 20,000 to about 28,000 during the same period. The number of Jewish deaths in Ukraine dropped from about 15,000 in 1935–1936 to about 12,000 in 1938–1940, whereas the number of Jewish births decreased from about 15,000 to about 11,000 during the same period.